favoritter/internal/middleware/csrf.go

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feat: implement Phase 1 (auth) and Phase 2 (faves CRUD) foundation Go backend with server-rendered HTML/HTMX frontend, SQLite database, and filesystem image storage. Self-hostable single-binary architecture. Phase 1 — Authentication & project foundation: - Argon2id password hashing with timing-attack prevention - Session management with cookie-based auth and periodic cleanup - Login, signup (open/requests/closed modes), logout, forced password reset - CSRF double-submit cookie pattern with HTMX auto-inclusion - Proxy-aware real IP extraction (WireGuard/Tailscale support) - Configurable base path for subdomain and subpath deployment - Rate limiting on auth endpoints with background cleanup - Security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy) - Structured logging with slog, graceful shutdown - Pico CSS + HTMX vendored and embedded via go:embed Phase 2 — Faves CRUD with tags and images: - Full CRUD for favorites with ownership checks - Image upload with EXIF stripping, resize to 1920px, UUID filenames - Tag system with HTMX autocomplete (prefix search, popularity-sorted) - Privacy controls (public/private per fave, user-configurable default) - Tag browsing, pagination, batch tag loading (avoids N+1) - OpenGraph meta tags on public fave detail pages Includes code quality pass: extracted shared helpers, fixed signup request persistence bug, plugged rate limiter memory leak, removed dead code, and logged previously-swallowed errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 15:55:22 +02:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package middleware
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"net/http"
"strings"
"kode.naiv.no/olemd/favoritter/internal/config"
)
const (
csrfCookieName = "csrf_token"
csrfFormField = "csrf_token"
csrfHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
)
// CSRFProtection implements double-submit cookie pattern for CSRF prevention.
// A token is stored in a cookie and must also be submitted in a form field
// or header on state-changing requests (POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH).
func CSRFProtection(cfg *config.Config) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Read or generate the CSRF token.
token := ""
if cookie, err := r.Cookie(csrfCookieName); err == nil {
token = cookie.Value
}
if token == "" {
token = generateCSRFToken()
secure := IsSecureRequest(r, cfg)
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: csrfCookieName,
Value: token,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: false, // JS needs to read it for HTMX hx-headers
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
// Attach token to context for templates.
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), csrfTokenKey, token)
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
// Validate on state-changing methods.
if isStateChangingMethod(r.Method) {
// Skip CSRF check for API routes that use Bearer auth (future).
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
submitted := r.FormValue(csrfFormField)
if submitted == "" {
submitted = r.Header.Get(csrfHeaderName)
}
if submitted != token {
http.Error(w, "CSRF token mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
func isStateChangingMethod(method string) bool {
switch method {
case http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPatch:
return true
}
return false
}
func generateCSRFToken() string {
b := make([]byte, 32)
rand.Read(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(b)
}
// IsSecureRequest determines if the original client request used HTTPS,
// checking X-Forwarded-Proto from trusted proxies.
func IsSecureRequest(r *http.Request, cfg *config.Config) bool {
if cfg.ExternalURL != "" {
return strings.HasPrefix(cfg.ExternalURL, "https://")
}
if proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); proto != "" {
return proto == "https"
}
return r.TLS != nil
}