forgejo-mcp-broker/internal/oauth/oauth_internal_test.go

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feat(oauth): authorization-server endpoints (forgejo-mcp-broker-pur) Implements internal/oauth, the broker's OAuth 2.1 AS surface that Claude.ai (and other MCP clients) talk to. User authentication is delegated to upstream Forgejo via internal/forgejo. Endpoints: POST /oauth/register — RFC 7591 dynamic client registration GET /oauth/authorize — RFC 6749 + 7636 PKCE (S256 only) GET /oauth/callback — Forgejo redirects back here after consent POST /oauth/token — authorization_code + refresh_token grants POST /oauth/revoke — RFC 7009 Security model: - PKCE required, S256 only — plain method rejected per OAuth 2.1 - Every broker-issued access/refresh token stored as hex(sha256(plain)); plaintext leaves the broker exactly once in the /token response body - Refresh-token rotation: each refresh issues a new token pair and revokes the old refresh (RFC 6749 §10.4) - Auth-code single-use enforced atomically via UPDATE...WHERE used_at IS NULL with rows-affected check, blocking the concurrent-replay race - Issuer URL sourced from cfg.Issuer at construction time, never from inbound headers — prevents host-header injection on /.well-known metadata that ships in 2d - redirect_uri must match a registered URI exactly (no prefix/wildcard) Pending-authorization state (between /authorize and /callback) lives in an in-memory sync.Map with a 1-minute reaper goroutine. A broker restart drops them, forcing the user to re-authorize — acceptable trade-off versus introducing a fifth table. Tests: 81.0% coverage with ~20 cases across happy paths, every required- field error, PKCE failure, code-replay, refresh expiry/revocation, client-id and redirect-uri mismatches, Forgejo-side errors, and the reaper logic itself (internal test). Closes forgejo-mcp-broker-pur. The OAuth keystone is in place; phase 2c unblocks discovery (2d) and security review (2e), and combined with the existing supervisor + bridge it unblocks the session glue work in phase 5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-27 17:04:34 +02:00
package oauth
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// reapPending only runs every minute via the background ticker, so
// production tests can't drive it within a reasonable timeout. This
// internal test exercises the reaper logic directly.
func TestReapPending_RemovesExpired(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 4, 27, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
s := &Server{now: func() time.Time { return now }}
s.pending.Store("expired-1", &pendingAuth{expiresAt: now.Add(-time.Minute)})
s.pending.Store("expired-2", &pendingAuth{expiresAt: now.Add(-time.Hour)})
s.pending.Store("fresh", &pendingAuth{expiresAt: now.Add(time.Hour)})
s.reapPending()
for _, key := range []string{"expired-1", "expired-2"} {
if _, ok := s.pending.Load(key); ok {
t.Errorf("%q should have been reaped", key)
}
}
if _, ok := s.pending.Load("fresh"); !ok {
t.Error("fresh entry was wrongly reaped")
}
}
// secureToken's output is non-deterministic, so we test shape: hex,
// expected length, and that two consecutive calls differ.
func TestSecureToken_Shape(t *testing.T) {
a := secureToken(16)
b := secureToken(16)
if a == b {
t.Error("two secureToken calls produced identical output")
}
if len(a) != 32 {
t.Errorf("secureToken(16) length = %d, want 32", len(a))
}
for _, c := range a {
if !strings.ContainsRune("0123456789abcdef", c) {
t.Errorf("non-hex character %q in token", c)
break
}
}
}
func TestVerifyPKCE_Roundtrip(t *testing.T) {
verifier := "the-quick-brown-fox-jumps-over-the-lazy-dog-12345678"
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
challenge := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])
if !verifyPKCE(verifier, challenge) {
t.Error("verifyPKCE should accept matching verifier+challenge")
}
if verifyPKCE(verifier, challenge+"x") {
t.Error("verifyPKCE should reject a mutated challenge")
}
if verifyPKCE("WRONG", challenge) {
t.Error("verifyPKCE should reject a wrong verifier")
}
}
func TestUserIDInt64(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]int64{
"42": 42,
"": 0,
"abc": 0,
"123abc": 0,
"99999999999": 99999999999,
}
for in, want := range cases {
if got := userIDInt64(in); got != want {
t.Errorf("userIDInt64(%q) = %d, want %d", in, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestValidateRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
in string
ok bool
}{
{"https", "https://app.example.com/cb", true},
{"http_loopback_localhost", "http://localhost:1234/cb", true},
{"http_loopback_v4", "http://127.0.0.1/cb", true},
{"http_loopback_v6", "http://[::1]/cb", true},
{"http_non_loopback", "http://app.example.com/cb", false},
{"reverse_dns_scheme", "com.example.claudeapp:/cb", true},
{"single_word_scheme", "claude://oauth/cb", false},
{"javascript_scheme", "javascript:alert(1)", false},
{"data_scheme", "data:text/html,<h1>hi</h1>", false},
feat(oauth): authorization-server endpoints (forgejo-mcp-broker-pur) Implements internal/oauth, the broker's OAuth 2.1 AS surface that Claude.ai (and other MCP clients) talk to. User authentication is delegated to upstream Forgejo via internal/forgejo. Endpoints: POST /oauth/register — RFC 7591 dynamic client registration GET /oauth/authorize — RFC 6749 + 7636 PKCE (S256 only) GET /oauth/callback — Forgejo redirects back here after consent POST /oauth/token — authorization_code + refresh_token grants POST /oauth/revoke — RFC 7009 Security model: - PKCE required, S256 only — plain method rejected per OAuth 2.1 - Every broker-issued access/refresh token stored as hex(sha256(plain)); plaintext leaves the broker exactly once in the /token response body - Refresh-token rotation: each refresh issues a new token pair and revokes the old refresh (RFC 6749 §10.4) - Auth-code single-use enforced atomically via UPDATE...WHERE used_at IS NULL with rows-affected check, blocking the concurrent-replay race - Issuer URL sourced from cfg.Issuer at construction time, never from inbound headers — prevents host-header injection on /.well-known metadata that ships in 2d - redirect_uri must match a registered URI exactly (no prefix/wildcard) Pending-authorization state (between /authorize and /callback) lives in an in-memory sync.Map with a 1-minute reaper goroutine. A broker restart drops them, forcing the user to re-authorize — acceptable trade-off versus introducing a fifth table. Tests: 81.0% coverage with ~20 cases across happy paths, every required- field error, PKCE failure, code-replay, refresh expiry/revocation, client-id and redirect-uri mismatches, Forgejo-side errors, and the reaper logic itself (internal test). Closes forgejo-mcp-broker-pur. The OAuth keystone is in place; phase 2c unblocks discovery (2d) and security review (2e), and combined with the existing supervisor + bridge it unblocks the session glue work in phase 5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-27 17:04:34 +02:00
{"missing_scheme", "app.example.com/cb", false},
{"unparseable", "://no-scheme", false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateRedirectURI(tc.in)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected ok, got %v", err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Error("expected error, got nil")
}
})
}
}