- TypeScript 66.4%
- Svelte 27.7%
- CSS 2.9%
- Shell 1.6%
- JavaScript 0.7%
- Other 0.7%
A fourth visibility level ("Venner") with one-way friendship and
two-way block filtering, plus the table-rebuild migration that drags
older dev DBs forward.
Visibility model:
- Friendship is directional: (owner, friend) means owner has added
friend to their list. Owner's friends-only activities become
visible to friend; friend isn't automatically friends with owner.
- Blocking is also directional at the DB level (blocker, blocked)
but is checked SYMMETRICALLY at visibility-resolution time: once
either user has blocked the other, friends-only content stops
flowing in either direction. Block does NOT affect public or
anonymous content — those are open to anyone by definition.
- "Friends-only" is an access-list visibility, NOT cryptographic.
The server stores the content in plaintext and serves it only to
authorised viewers. This is documented honestly in /personvern.
Schema:
- activities.visibility CHECK gains 'friends' as a fourth value
- friends(owner_id, friend_id, created_at) — composite PK,
self-friending blocked by CHECK
- user_blocks(blocker_id, blocked_id, created_at) — same shape,
blocking-self also blocked
Migration (server/db.ts):
- SQLite can't ALTER a CHECK constraint, so the migration detects
out-of-date DBs by scanning sqlite_master for the literal
"'friends'" in the activities table's CREATE statement
- If absent, rebuilds activities via the standard SQLite
table-copy-drop-rename dance with foreign_keys briefly off
around the transaction, then runs foreign_key_check to confirm
no FKs were left orphaned (activity_tags, activity_hearts,
bookmarks all point at activities). Smoke-tested on the dev DB:
olemd's user row and moderator/admin flags survived.
Server endpoints (server/friends.ts):
GET /api/friends — my outgoing list
GET /api/friends/incoming — who has added ME
POST /api/friends — add by username (idempotent)
DELETE /api/friends/:userId — remove a friend
GET /api/friends/blocks — my blocked-users list
POST /api/friends/blocks — block by user_id (idempotent)
DELETE /api/friends/blocks/:userId — unblock
Add-by-username (not by email): users must set a username to be
findable. Email stays a private contact identifier.
Activity list filter (server/activities.ts): adds two clauses to the
WHERE — own friends-only, and friends-only owned by a user who has
added me AND there's no block in either direction. Single-activity
GET applies the same check.
Frontend:
- ActivityForm.svelte gains the "Venner" option
- ActivityRow.svelte renders a "Venner" badge with a new amber
vis-badge.friends colour (passes contrast in both themes)
- FriendsPanel.svelte: add-by-username form, outgoing, incoming
(with Block button), and blocked (with Unblock button)
- Profile.svelte mounts FriendsPanel between display fields and
Eksporter
- Home.svelte adds a "Venner" section between private and semi
Docs: Personvern.svelte gains a "Venner og blokkering" section
explaining that friends-only is access-list-not-crypto and pointing
the reader at "private" for actually-sensitive content.
26 tests still pass; typecheck clean; build succeeds. Bundle
36.8 KB → 39.1 KB gzipped (FriendsPanel + new server endpoints +
the Personvern prose).
|
||
|---|---|---|
| frontend | ||
| server | ||
| shared | ||
| tests | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| bun.lock | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| Containerfile | ||
| package.json | ||
| README.md | ||
| SECURITY.md | ||
| tsconfig.json | ||
| winter-list-claude-code-prompt.md | ||
Vinterliste
A small end-to-end-encrypted app for collecting winter activities — things to do when winter feels long. Activities can be:
- private — encrypted client-side; the server only ever sees ciphertext;
- semi-public — visible to everyone, but the creator is not shown;
- public — visible to everyone, attributed to the creator.
See SECURITY.md for the cryptographic model. It's load-bearing
— read it before changing anything in shared/crypto.ts or the auth flow.
Stack
- Runtime: Bun 1.3+. TypeScript everywhere.
- HTTP: Hono on Bun.
- DB:
bun:sqlite(built-in), WAL mode. - Server password hashing:
Bun.password(argon2id) — auth verifier only. - Client crypto:
libsodium-wrappers-sumo(WASM — the SUMO build is needed because the standardlibsodium-wrappersdoesn't shipcrypto_pwhash). Argon2id viacrypto_pwhash; AEAD via XChaCha20-Poly1305-IETF. - Frontend: Svelte 5 + Vite. Private tag index in IndexedDB.
- Container: single
oven/bunimage, one volume for the SQLite file.
Layout
shared/ pure modules used by both server and frontend
crypto.ts libsodium-backed key derivation, AEAD, wrap/unwrap, helpers
types.ts wire-level types shared across the network boundary
server/ Bun + Hono backend
db.ts bun:sqlite, WAL, idempotent schema migration
session.ts opaque, server-stored sessions (httpOnly cookie)
auth.ts signup, challenge, login, logout, password change, recovery
activities.ts CRUD with visibility rules
tags.ts server-side (public/semi) tag store + autocomplete
index.ts Hono app + static frontend in production
frontend/ Vite + Svelte 5 SPA
src/lib/crypto.ts re-exports shared/crypto for bundling
src/lib/api.ts fetch wrapper for the JSON API
src/lib/auth.ts signup/login/recovery orchestration
src/lib/tagIndex.ts IndexedDB store for private tags
src/lib/session.svelte.ts in-memory DEK + current user
src/components/ Svelte 5 components (Login, Signup, Recovery, Home, …)
tests/ Bun tests
crypto.test.ts round-trip wrap/unwrap, AEAD, password change, recovery
Containerfile single-image build for podman
Running locally
You need Bun 1.3+ installed.
bun install
# 1. In one terminal — start the API on http://localhost:3000
bun run dev:server
# 2. In another terminal — start the Vite dev server on http://localhost:5173
# (it proxies /api to :3000)
bun run dev:frontend
The dev server writes the SQLite file to data/vinterliste.db. Set
VINTERLISTE_DB=/some/other/path to override.
Tests
bun test
The crypto tests cover:
- DEK wrap/unwrap via both the password and recovery paths;
- AEAD encrypt/decrypt round-trip, plus tamper and wrong-key rejection;
- password change preserves activity ciphertexts (DEK is the same);
- recovery unlocks even after multiple password changes;
- recovery-code normalisation handles dashes and casing;
- the safe alphabet excludes visually ambiguous characters.
Typecheck
bun run typecheck
Production build
bun run build:frontend # produces frontend/dist
NODE_ENV=production bun run start
The server serves the SPA from frontend/dist in production. All non-/api/*,
non-/assets/* requests fall through to index.html so client-side routing
still works.
Container (podman)
The provided Containerfile builds a single image that serves API + frontend
and persists the SQLite database in /app/data (one volume).
BUILDAH_FORMAT=docker podman build \
--build-arg BUILD_DATE="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)" \
--build-arg GIT_REVISION="$(git describe --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || echo dev)" \
-t vinterliste:latest .
# Create a named volume for the SQLite file
podman volume create vinterliste-data
podman run --replace --name vinterliste \
-p 3000:3000 \
-v vinterliste-data:/app/data:Z \
vinterliste:latest
# Visit http://localhost:3000
The container exposes /api/health for healthchecks and bakes the build date /
git revision into both OCI labels and /etc/build-info.
Registration: open, invite-only, or both
Admins can toggle self-registration from the Admin UI. Two modes:
- Open (default): anyone can hit
/→ "Logg inn" → "Opprett konto". - Closed: the "Opprett konto" button is hidden; new accounts can only be created through invite links.
Any logged-in user can generate invite links from their Profile page. Each
link is single-use; the link URL is /<origin>/invite/<token> and the
recipient is dropped straight into the signup form with the token attached.
Successful invite-signups record users.invited_by = <inviter_id> so the
account has a traceable origin. Invites that have been claimed are kept in
the DB (they can no longer be cancelled) so the audit trail survives.
Installable (PWA) + mobile
The SPA ships with a web app manifest (/manifest.webmanifest), an SVG icon
(/icon.svg), and a small service worker (/sw.js) that caches the bundled
shell for offline reads. The API itself is never cached — sessions and
ciphertexts must come fresh from the server. On supported browsers
(Chrome/Edge on Android and desktop, Firefox with the flag) you'll see an
"Install" prompt; on iOS you can Add to Home Screen but iOS doesn't render
SVG icons, so the home-screen icon will fall back to the page screenshot.
Layout adapts to small screens via:
viewportset towidth=device-width, initial-scale=1, viewport-fit=cover- safe-area insets in
paddingso content doesn't slip under iOS notches min-height: 44pxon buttons (WCAG 2.5.5 enhanced touch target)font-size: 16pxon inputs below 480px so iOS doesn't auto-zoom
Roles: moderator and admin
There are three privilege levels:
| Role | What it grants |
|---|---|
| Anonymous | Browse public + semi activities, view opt-in /<username>/list pages |
| User | + manage own activities, edit own profile, submit feedback |
| Moderator | + delete any semi/public activity, read the feedback list |
| Admin | + grant/revoke moderator and admin on other users (via /api/admin/users) |
Admin implies moderator — admins automatically pass any is_moderator check.
The first user to sign up is auto-promoted to admin so a fresh deployment is never stranded without one. After that, admins can grant moderator/admin to others through the Admin UI. If for any reason that didn't happen (e.g., you imported a DB), you can still bootstrap manually:
# Manually promote (e.g. for imported DBs):
sqlite3 data/vinterliste.db \
"UPDATE users SET is_admin = 1 WHERE email = 'you@example.org';"
# Promote a plain moderator (admins can also do this from the UI):
sqlite3 data/vinterliste.db \
"UPDATE users SET is_moderator = 1 WHERE email = 'them@example.org';"
The user has to log out and back in for the in-memory session.user to
refresh — server-side authz updates on the next request regardless.
A last-admin safety net is wired into the role-update endpoint: an admin
trying to demote themselves while they're the only remaining admin gets a
409 cannot_demote_last_admin. If you really want to strand the deployment
with no admin, you have to use sqlite3 directly.
Manual verification
After signing up an account, the spec asks you to inspect a private row
directly in the DB and confirm only ciphertext is stored:
sqlite3 data/vinterliste.db \
"SELECT id, visibility, title, loc_label, scheduled_at,
length(ciphertext) AS ct_len, length(nonce) AS nc_len
FROM activities WHERE visibility = 'private';"
You should see title, loc_label, and scheduled_at all NULL, and the
ciphertext / nonce columns populated.
Status / scope
This is the scaffold from winter-list-claude-code-prompt.md. In scope:
- repo structure, schema, single-image container
- crypto module + tests
- signup / login / password change / recovery
- activity CRUD with strict visibility handling
- tag autocomplete (server
tagstable + client IndexedDB)
Explicitly out of scope for now:
- sharing/permissions beyond the three visibility levels
- comments, notifications, other social features
- native/mobile apps
- server-side full-text search over private data
- rate limiting on auth/recovery endpoints (defense-in-depth — the recovery verifier already closes the lockout-DoS hole; rate limiting reduces online brute-force surface)